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Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Research Assistants

Lukas Block

Kontakt
Vita
Publikationen
 Lukas Block

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter

Telefon:
+49 5251 60-1655
Büro:
Q0.419
Web:
Besucher:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
 Lukas Block
01.11.2015

Universität Paderborn - Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter

01.10.2012 - 30.09.2015

Universität Paderborn - Master of Science in International Economics and Management

01.10.2009 - 30.09.2012

Universität Paderborn - Bachelor of Arts in International Business Studies

Aufsatz - Die Europäische Währungsunion: Thesen zu ihrer Weiterentwicklung

http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.49039/

Aufsatz - Draghis Welt

http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.41736/

Dr. Papatya Duman

Kontakt
Vita
Publikationen
Dr. Papatya Duman

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Postdoc

Telefon:
+49 5251 60-3889
Büro:
Q4.340
Besucher:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn

Center of International Economics

Postdoc

Dr. Papatya Duman
14.05.2018

PostDoc - SFB 901 "On-The-Fly-Computing"

Paderborn University

01.09.2009 - 10.01.2018

PhD in Economics

Istanbul Bilgi University - Joint Programme of Master and PhD Studies
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Walter Trockel
Thesis Title:  Three Essays on the Fundamentals of Game Theory

09/2005 - 06/2009

BA Mathematics

Istanbul Bilgi University 

1. Publications

2020: Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story in: Behavioral Game Theory: Theory and Experiments, Games 11(1), 9

2016: On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game (with W. Trockel) in: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1(1) pp. 83-107

2. Working Papers

Non-cohesive TU-games: Efficiency and Duality (with F. Aslan and W. Trockel)

Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria (with W. Trockel)

The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (with C.J. Haake and T. Upmann)

3. Presentations

2019: Murat Sertel Workshop, Istanbul
2019: Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), Ischia/Italy
2019: 6th Workshop on "Cooperative Game Theory in Business Practice", Leipzig

2019: Conference on Economic Design, Budapest

2018: 14th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING14), Bayreuth
2017: The 12th BIGSEM Doctoral Workshop, Bielefeld
2017: III. Behavioral and Experimental Workshop, Ankara
2017: II. Genc Bilim Insanlari Sempozyumu, Istanbul
2016: GAMES 2016, the 5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, Maastricht
2016: 5th Bilkent-Economics Annual Summer Workshop, Ankara
2016: The 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Lund
2015: The 2015 Conference on Economic Design, Istanbul
2015: 8th RGS Doctoral Conference, Essen

Sarah Kühn

Kontakt
Vita
 Sarah Kühn

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin - SFB901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

Telefon:
+49 5251 60-3889
Büro:
Q4.340
Besucher:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
 Sarah Kühn
01.04.2020 - heute

Promotionsstudentin und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomie

01.10.2017 - 29.11.2019

M.Sc. International Economics and Management, Universität Paderborn

Masterarbeit: "Compatibilities in Matching Mechanisms"

01.10.2013 - 30.09.2017

B.Sc. International Business Studies, Universität Paderborn

Bachelorarbeit: "Outsourcing und Qualität im Supply Chain: Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse"

Thomas Streck, M.Sc.

Kontakt
Vita
Publikationen
 Thomas Streck, M.Sc.

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter - SFB901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

Telefon:
+49 5251 60-3720
Büro:
Q4.343
Sprechzeiten:

Wednesday 2:30-3:30 pm (please mail me in advance, online meeting possible)

Besucher:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
 Thomas Streck, M.Sc.
11/2017 - heute

Promotionsstudent und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomie

Arbeitsbereiche: kooperative Spieltheorie (Verhandlungen), Matchingtheorie

 

04/2015 - 10/2017

M.Sc. International Economics and Management, Universität Paderborn

Masterarbeit: „How to adequately relocate asylum applicants within the European Union - An attempt to apply matching theory in the current migration crisis“

10/2011 - 03/2015

B.Sc. International Business Studies, Universität Paderborn

Bachelorarbeit: „Praktikabilität des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei variablem Status Quo-Punkt und exogenen Einflüssen“

Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Kontakt
Vita
Publikationen
Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Postdoc - Forschung im SFB901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

Telefon:
+49 5251 60-3367
Fax:
+49 5251 60-3365
Büro:
Q4.343
Sprechzeiten:

nach Vereinbarung

Web:
Besucher:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn

Center of International Economics

Postdoc

Dr. Nadja Stroh-Maraun
03.06.2020 - heute

PostDoc - SFB 901 "On-The-Fly-Computing"

10/2013 - 04/2020

PhD in Business Administration and Economics

Thesis: “Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets”

10/2011 - 09/2013

M.Sc. International Economics, Paderborn University

Master Thesis: „Dynamic One-to-One Matching – Theory and a Job Market Application“

10/2008 - 09/2011

B.Sc. Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University

Bachelor Thesis: „Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme“


Liste im Research Information System öffnen

2020

Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior (2020), 121, pp. 453 - 481

We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.


Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets

N. Stroh-Maraun, Universität Paderborn, 2020

DOI


2018

A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour (2018), 17(3), pp. 290 - 301

DOI


Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value

M. Feldotto, C. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6

We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.


Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics (2018), 39(3), pp. 354 - 362

DOI


More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games

N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing (2018), 25, pp. 26-36

DOI


Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters (2018), 170, pp. 39 - 41

We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.


2017

Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017

In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.


2013

Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application

N. Stroh-Maraun, Masterarbeit, Universität Paderborn, 2013


2011

Prozedurale Ansätze zur Lösung mehrdimensionaler Verhandlungsprobleme

N. Stroh-Maraun, Bachelorarbeit, Universität Paderborn, 2011


Liste im Research Information System öffnen

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