Achtung:

Sie haben Javascript deaktiviert!
Sie haben versucht eine Funktion zu nutzen, die nur mit Javascript möglich ist. Um sämtliche Funktionalitäten unserer Internetseite zu nutzen, aktivieren Sie bitte Javascript in Ihrem Browser.

Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests“ (joined with Wolfgang Leininger and Cédric Wasser)

On 19th June 2017 (1-2pm) Jörg Franke, research assistant for economics at the University of Technology Dortmund, will give a presentation about “Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests" in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Franke will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/dep1/me/research/discussing-research/seam/.

Abstract

We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete informationall-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: Head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids. In the all-pay auction, head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first-best revenue. In the lottery contest, head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue. As all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests under optimal biases, we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue-ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments.

 

 

 

 

The University for the Information Society