On 17th June 2019 (1-2pm) Dr. Marc Schröder, postdoc at the chair of management science at RWTH Aachen University, will give a presentation about “Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs” in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Schröder will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of: https://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/dep1/me/research/discussing-research/seam/
We consider an atomic congestion game with stochastic demand in which each player participates in the game with probability p, and incurs no cost with probability 1-p. We assume that p is common knowledge among all players, but the outcome of the random variable is private information. We investigate how the price of anarchy of this incomplete information game depends on the probability p. We provide tight bounds on both the price of anarchy as well as on the price of stability for all values of p. This is joint work with Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini and Nicolas Stier-Moses.